The Russian-Belarussian Relationship
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian foreign policy towards the West and its former satellite states has undergone significant changes. In particular, under the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin, attitudes towards Belarus have become increasingly based on his individual ideology and perceptions of different institutions- namely the Union State, NATO, and the European Union- and the fears that are perpetuated by them.
The Kremlin leader’s emerging posture of anti-Western economic and political liberalism, which are indicative of his fears of Western institutions, has led him to pursue the cloaked domination of Belarus through institutions of his own. By correlating his own self-enrichment to Russia’s economic success, Putin has reason to fear a potential pro-democracy revolution in Belarus spurred by institutions like NATO or the EU, which further drives his response towards Belarus. Additionally, his obsession with power perception and his desire to remain in power are important source variables to his views towards Belarus. Overall, Putin’s foreign policy towards his eastern neighbour is guided by fears of the West, his desire to remain in power, and parallel national and self economic motives.
In order to cement his influence, Putin has wielded power over the Belarussian economy through its energy dependence on Russia. Putin has increasingly created an environment of forced-necessity between himself and Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, who relies on the political backing of the Kremlin in order to cement his rule as “Europe’s last dictator.”
In this analysis, I will place a key focus on institutions in the West and in Russia’s sphere of influence and how they are connected to the larger ideological source variables discussed above. First, I will analyse the formation of the Union State between Russia and Belarus, and how Putin’s views towards economic and political integration were a direct challenge to Belarussian leadership. Second, I will discuss Belarussian energy dependence and how it related to the Kremlin’s strain of economic nationalism. Third, I will relate my second point to Putin’s fears of NATO and the EU, and how they legitimately threaten his regime. Last, I will discuss the current pro-democracy movement in Belarus and how it has changed Russian foreign policy.
The power formations of the Union State
After 1991, most former Soviet republics attempted to define themselves as independent states. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all joined NATO, the EU, the OECD, and the eurozone in an effort to distance themselves from Russian influence. However, Belarus has followed a much different path than its Baltic neighbors.
After the election of the pro-Russian Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko in 1994 (the last legitimate election in that country) and the growing demand within Russia for President Yeltsin to reunify the two, it was assumed that Belarus would slowly be incorporated into Russia. That assumption was confirmed in April 1997, when the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus agreed that the integration of military, political, economic, and foreign policy was beneficial to both parties. And thus, the international organization known as The Union State was born.
While the stated motives for the union were security and prosperity, both Belarus and Russia had ulterior motives for the foundation of the Union State apparatus. In Russia, Yeltsin needed the backing of pro-unification politicians in order to give the government a stronger mandate. Lukashenko was also intent on consolidating power, but in a different way: he planned to “use the arrangement to ultimately replace the unpopular Yeltsin,” since the creation of the Union State could allow for common citizenship and thus an avenue to ruling over both countries. However, a major political shift effectively ended Lukashenko’s dreams of his salient rise. In 1999, Yeltsin decided to step down and support a hand-picked successor in the presidential elections following that year: a relatively unknown, former KGB-agent named Vladimir Putin.
The Union State under Putin and Lukashenko: failure and distrust
The election of Putin was a big disappointment for Lukashenko’s goals of domination, and largely disrupted the pillars of the Union State that had been agreed upon by Yeltsin and Lukashenko. The new Kremlin leader’s actions and policies, coupled with a tense relationship with President Lukashenko, transformed the previous integrating mission of the organization into an economic and political failure.
After his election to the presidency in 2000 and into the early 2010s, Vladimir Putin slowly began consolidating political power and centralizing the Russian state economy for his own self benefit. He began a spree of semi-nationalizing or fully-nationalizing large sectors of the energy sector, like Gazprom, in order to cement his influence over the oligarch class. Putin also began to limit independent institutions: the media, opposition parties, and all government organizations were closely monitored by loyalists inside the Kremlin. Additionally, Putin was able to correlate his own self-interest with the interests of the Russian state by installing pro-Putin operatives to the highest levels of economic power.
Putin was determined to protect himself, his countries’ image, and his citizens (in that order), which led to a change in policy towards Belarus. He demanded that “Minsk should compensate” Russia- who was supplying Belarus with low-cost gas and oil- by giving Russian companies access to the “command heights” of the Belarusian economy. Putin, unlike his predecessor, distrusted key economic pillars of the alliance, like a shared currency and common market. In a meeting with Lukashenko in 2002, Putin commented that “there can be no attempts to restore the USSR at the expense of Russia’s economic interests,” demonstrating how Putin felt the creation of a joint economy would disproportionately burden his country’s economy. The disillusionment with the Union’s founding economic goals was also felt on the Belarussian side, as President Lukashenko became unwilling to commit to a single currency that was issued by the Russian Central Bank, possibly out of fear that Putin would seek to control even more of the Belarussian economy.
The pursuit of political structures, like a parliament capable of passing legislation for both states, was effectively ended due to concerns on both sides. Lukashenko was unwilling to pursue a full political union after he realized he would not be able to become the leader of the Union State. Indeed, with the election of Putin, union with Russia would almost certainly mean sidelining Lukasehnko’s own leadership. The Belarussian view was clear: that they would be willing to politically integrate only if both states kept their distinct sovereignty, and the Union State was only able to make limited impacts on national policy.
Putin’s view was expressed in June 2002, when he claimed that “the unification of such close countries as Russia and Belarus should be carried out on an unconditional basis within the framework of a single state … there should be one parliament, … there should be one government and one country.” It remains unclear, however, if the motives behind this comment were genuine or if they were a part of a wider goal of forcing Lukashenko to reject Russian proposals and thus further slow the integration of the Union State.
The Union State and Putin’s ideology
Putin’s rejection of the Union State apparatus at the beginning of his term is indicative of a large world view and individual political methodology. During his service in the KGB before the fall of the Soviet Union, Putin was aware of the constraints state socialist policies had put on his county. He had seen the epitome of the capitalist-command economy divide in Germany, where a prosperous West prevailed over an impoverished East. Putin, and his Russian counterparts alike, came to realize that the collapse of the Soviet Union was finite and that former states were not Russian brothers, rather foreign nations. This belief is best summarized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a writer and critic of the former communist regime who criticized the Russian state for providing cheap commodities to the Warsaw Pact at the expense of Russian citizens.
The connection between Putin and Solzhenitsyn’s ideological beliefs rest on economic nationalism and Russia exceptionalism, which is related to Putin’s larger narrative of seeing himself as protector of the Russian economy, state, identity, and culture. In the case of the Union State, Putin was not willing to fully integrate markets and adopt a common currency with Belarus, because he saw it as a massive cost to his country without any benefits. Instead, he used nationalized control of the oil industry in his country to cement his economic power over Belarus, in order to influence its markets and political tendencies (which will be discussed in further detail in following sections). Putin was also not willing to compromise his state integrity with the possibility of a supranational Union State parliament capable of impacting Russian laws and legal code. He was set on maximizing his power within the Russian Federation, and any attempt that Lukashenko could have to change the power dynamic was not acceptable. Indeed, due to the resurgence of Russian exceptionalism, Putin began to think of Belarus similarly to how “European powers approached their colonies in the 19th and early 20th centuries- that colonies should benefit their masters, not live at their expense.”
At the start of his term, Putin approached Belarus- and the Union State- with an air of suspicion. Unlike President Yeltsin, he was unwilling to let strong-man Lukashenko amass power within the institution. It would take decades, coupled with the erosion of Russian interests across Eurasia, to make him change his mind on the Union State and its goal of uniting Belarus and Russia (which will be discussed in later sections). Indeed, the case of the Union State and its de-facto Russian dismantlement set the stage for future relations with Belarus: one of forced partnership based on Russian economic superiority and on Putin’s commitment to keep NATO and the EU out of the East.
Energy Dependency in Belarus: Russia’s conquest strategy
Belarus is defined as an energy-dependent state, since the county lacks energy resources to cover its needs and imports considerable amounts of energy (mainly in the form of oil and natural gas) from Russia. Indeed, energy politics are a key ingredient to understanding Putin’s foreign policy towards Belarus.
Energy politics, according to Brenda Shaffer in the book Energy Politics, is a focus on the “politics of oil and natural gas since… their production, transport, and supply are entwined in international politics.” Energy security is a major part of energy politics and is based on the criteria of “the 4A’s: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and affordability of energy.” The International Energy Agency defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy courses at an affordable price.” Belarus meets none of the previous requirements of energy security, as oil and gas availability, access, and price are all controlled by Russia.
Currently, Russia is considered by others as well as by itself to be an energy superpower. The country has successfully turned its energy supplies into a geopolitical force. Two factors were necessary: total and unconditional subordination of energy corporations to the exporting state (through nationalization), and the dependency of the importing nations’ economies on an external energy monopolist. As shown in Figure 1, Russian exports of oil and natural gas make up almost 50% of the goods that are traded between the countries: a perfect display of the institutionalized energy dependence of Belarus. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will describe how the Russian Federation has infiltrated and exploited the energy security of Belarus and subjected it to the status of a rentier state. Additionally, energy politics and energy dependence will be used to demonstrate how Putin seeks to use his country’s power to control Belarussian policy and dictate orders to President Lukashenko.
After Belarussian independence, the country had a difficult transition to sovereignty, particularly in its energy sector. The first years of its statehood were characterized by doubt regarding the direction of the country’s economic and political relations with Russia. In the middle of historically low levels of GDP output, presidential candidate Alexander Lukashenko capitalized on his country’s hardships and was elected President of the Republic. And luckily for the newly elected pro-Russian president, the economic output of the country increased dramatically (as did his popularity). Starting with a growth of -11.7% in 1994, in three years the Belarussian economy had grown to an annual GDP of 11.4%.
However, Lukashenko had not achieved economic success by opening his economy and integrating with the West, like his Baltic neighbors. Instead, the economic success in Lukashenko’s first term can be attributed to the establishment of a special energy trade relationship between Belarus and Russia. Since his ascension to the presidency, Belarus has benefited financially by purchasing gas from Russia for prices much lower than average. According to the IMF, in 1996 the agreed price for gas for Belarus was 50 dollars per thousand cubic meters, and in 1997 it was 49 dollars- 31 dollars below the international market pierce at that time.
While the special relationship benefitted Lukashenko, his oligarchs, and state owned companies in terms of GDP output, the agreement was crafted by Putin, for Putin. As Lukahsenko and his country continued to depend more on Russia’s generous gas prices, the energy security of Belarus continued to decrease. The most evident problem for Belarus was that in the case of any political, economic or even cultural disagreements with its main energy supplier, the country’s energy sector would automatically be put under massive pressure, and in many cases the country could suffer huge economic costs, as a result of any potential disobedience to Putin and his government.
Furthermore, Putin is able to perpetuate energy dependence in Belarus by using various political tools he has at his disposal- namely regional organizations. For instance, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was created by Moscow in an attempt to apply economic pressure- including energy pricing- to force regional states to join the pro-Russian bloc. The EAEU is perceived by Putin as a geopolitical tool, aimed at uniting the post-Soviet space against the European Union. With the advent of an institutionalized energy dependency apparatus in the form of the EAEU, Belarus has contributed even more to the erasure of its economic sovereignty. In 2016, one of the most serious energy-related conflicts between the two nations emerged when Belarus demanded a significant discount for purchasing gas from Gazprom, citing its EAEU membership and special relationship with Russia. Putin, not wishing to appear subordinate to a near-abroad state, issued a charged response. As punishment for Belarus’s grash demand, the Kremlin stated that Belarus had “accumulated debt for gas,” and had to pay out. Subsequently, oil supplies from Russia to Belarus were reduced from 24 million tons to 18 million tons.
This dispute illustrates that Putin does not distinguish between his countries gas trade relations and oil trade relations. Rather, he sees them as a political motivator: a singular monolith to be used against those who disobey, regardless of economic considerations. Indeed, Russia began to use oil to blackmail Belarus and force them to pay their accumulated debt for gas. As a result of the conflict, Belarus paid Russian debt that it has accumulated since the beginning of 2016.
With Belarussian energy dependence being exploited by Russia, Putin was (and still is) able to drastically increase or decrease the economic security of Belarus at will. In the next section, I will go further into why this relationship is so important to Putin, and what he is hoping to gain from Belarus’s crippled energy security.
Why is energy dependence important for Putin’s vision?
The inviability of Belarussian energy security and its exploitation by Putin demonstrates his mistrust with Western institutions like the European Union and the NATO Alliance, and his fear that near abroad states could fall to the pressures of economics and political liberalization.
Putin has seen this happen in the Baltic States when they joined NATO and the EU, and in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia during the so-called “color revolutions” of the 2000s. In those countries, popular movements demanded integration with the West and freedom from Russian influence. Further, Putin saw the United States take singular action against terrorists in the Middle East during the early 2000s, and had seen President Clinton and President Bush mock Russia’s standing in the world as a former superpower. For the Moscow strong-man, anti-Westernism and fears of those institutions have most certainly driven his energy dependence craze.
Through Russia’s economic superiority, Putin hopes to counter what he perceives as an attack on Russian society and stability by cultivating his country’s shining economic achievements: oil and natural gas distribution. The transformation of Russia’s economic prowess into geopolitical weapons reflects these institutional fears. In the next sections, I will discuss Putin’s trouble with the West, its connection to his pursuit of energy dependence in Belarus, and how both correlate directly with his foreign policy towards Belarus.
Putin’s Institutional Fears: NATO and the EU
This section again relates to the cornerstone of Putin’s ideology and defining source variable in his relationship towards Lukashenko and Belarus as a whole: the constant battle (in Putin’s eyes) between economic nationalism and Russia’s energy apparatuses, and the encroachment of globalized liberalism and democratic institutions and norms that Putin perceives as a direct attack on the identity of his nation.
Putin believes the two main institutions that embody liberal expansion and anti-Russianism are NATO and the EU. For instance, Putin has frequently claimed that Russia was willing to join NATO in the late 1990s, but was rebuffed and ostracized due anti-Russian hysteria. But in reality, Putin often leaves out the fact that Russia has “failed to meet the basic standards for either EU or NATO membership- whether in the rule of law, democratic governance or military reform.” Additionally, Russian officials contend that NATO captures post-communist countries and continues to threaten Russia’s borders. In reality, the enlargement of NATO has been voluntary and NATO joint-military exercise threatens Russian territorial integrity less than Russia’s military drills omit to neighboring nations.
Moscow’s leadership understands that NATO would not attack territory controlled by the Kremlin. The very assertion of an attack on either NATO territory or Russian territory is taboo on both sides, and is confined to the outskirts of social and political acceptability. However, this does not mean that Russia is without reasonable fears of Western organizations like NATO or the EU. In fact, Putin’s fears do not revolve around Russia’s national security, but are “based on profound anxieties about the future of the Putin administration,” which is reflective of his overall desire to remain in power.
First, the Kremlin leader has directly tied his presidency to restoring the great power status of Russia by reining in former Soviet states, like Belarus, through political means like the energy dependence apparatus and the EAEU. However, NATO and the EU deeply affect Putin’s ability to subvert the near abroad, because the collective security of these institutions thwarts Moscow’s ability to control former Soviet states’ security dimensions and foreign policy orientations. For instance, since the ascension of the Baltic States to EU-NATO membership, Russia has still attempted to influence their policy direction through limited economic ties, but can no longer instill corruption and pro-Russian sentiment effectively, as they have done throughout the 21st century in Belarus. In fact, Latvia and Estonia have restricted Russian-language education, against the wishes of Putin and the Kremlin. In this sense, NATO is an effective deterrent against Russia’s goal of ingraining energy dependency in former Soviet states, which destabilizes the very core of Putin’s foreign policy goals and regime legitimacy.
Second, Putin fears that European integration is a source of attraction for near abroad states. While Lukashenko is not keen on Belarus joining either the European Union or NATO, a majority of citizens do support further integration with European institutions. Despite anti-EU state propaganda on official TV, positive public perceptions of the EU increased from 40% in 2008 to 55% in 2013. Furthermore, the Belarussian youth seem to reject Putin’s abhorrence of the West, which has laid the foundations for the pro-democracy movement today. Indeed, this point relates to the economic dependency model Putin uses against states in the near abroad. His goal is to perpetuate anti-Westernism through economic ties, and to suggest that Russia has the capability to strangle their economy if they drift too close towards NATO or the EU (similar to Ukraine before the 2014 invasion). And if a state in Russia’s domain does initiate talks with Western powers, Moscow inverts reality by claiming that it is being surrounded by enemies and needs to pursue an aggressive, pro-Russian posture to combat “foreign-led operatives.”
Third, the Kremlin fears that European institutions challenge the credibility of the Russia state which, since Putin’s rise, has been increasingly controlled by the former-KGB top guard (who are not open to, as one could expect, easing the dictatorial powers of the centralized government). If Belarus, or any current dependency state, was able to assert economic improvement coupled with political freedom through integration, it would likely lead other states or federal regions to question the current system of top-bottom, anti-democratic rule. This is exactly the reason why Putin relies on energy as his weapon of choice for preventing Belarussian exploration into European integration: it forced them to choose between Russia or black-outs and financial ruin.
Putin’s ideology and approach towards Belarus is greatly shaped by these calculated fears of NATO and the European Union. However, the Kremlin may be facing its biggest threat to Belarussian relations in decades, a menace that confirms Putin’s perceived threats of the West. Looking at the Republic of Belarus today, Russia no longer sees a subservient, non-nationalist, pro-Russian population, which are all key variables to Putin’s continued dominance over the country. Today, Belarussian society is fractured between those who support President Lukashenko and his increasing crackdown on public liberties, and those who support the decentralized pro-democracy movement that is loosely led by opposition politician in-exil, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. The changing political dynamic is important for understanding Putin’s motives in the present, and the future. In the next section, I will discuss these developments in further detail, and stress how Russia’s relationship with Belarus- and President Lukashenko- is changing.
The pro-democracy movement in Belarus
After a presidential election on August 9th, 2020, incumbent president Alexander Lukashenko was reelected to serve a sixth term in office with 80.10% of the vote. The main opposition candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, received about 10% of the total vote share. However, Lukashenko’s decisive victory over Tsikhanouskaya and the pro-democracy “Country for Life” coalition was anything but free, fair, or transparent.
Before the election, Lukashenko and Belarussian security forces jailed and/or prohibited popular opposition candidates from running in the poll. For instance, Sergei Tikhanovsky, the husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, was jailed in May 2020 on charges of “inciting violence,” which forced Sviatlana to run in his place. After the election results had been certified, international observers like the OSCE recommended that the results be annulled “due to irregularities at all stages of the process,” urging Belarus to “organise new genuine presidential elections based on international standards.”
However, Lukashenko refused to acknowledge any election irregularities, and transitioned quietly into his next term with an untelevised and secretive ceremony at the Palace of Independence. Tsikhanouskaya, also in secret, slipped across the border into neighboring Lithuania and called on her supporters to peacefully protest the official election results, believing Lukashenko was an illegitimate president. Her campaign then formed the “Coordinational Council for the Transition of Power,” which demanded that Lukashenko call for a new presidential election at the earliest opportunity, with the threat of nation-wide gridlock through protests and strikes.
In early September 2020, Lukashenko flew to Sochi to meet with Putin after mass protests in Minsk- the capital of Belarus- had failed to stop. The meeting was seen as an opportunity for Lukashenko to signal to opposition protests that Russia, and its high number of security forces, were on his side. Lukashenko also wanted to project to Russia that he was still the man to keep Belarus in Putin’s orbit, which he did by painting protestors as anti-Russia. However, Russia also had cards to play and conditions to reep.
At the conference, Putin pledged a $1.5 billion loan to the embattled Lukashenko, along with the promise that joint military exercises would continue. He also supported Lukashenko’s false concerns about Western interference, and added Tsikhanouskaya to the nation’s wanted list–
without specifying charges or crimes committed. However, Putin was not giving Lukashenko support because of their long (and often troubled) history as allies. He was attempting to draw Lukashenko back into his sphere of influence, after years of tense relations following the Crimean annexation.
Belarussian attitudes towards Russia following the Crimean annexation
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, Lukashenko was empowered with a rival of a distinctively Belarussian identity. His press for idiosyncratic nationalism was realised later that year, when he gave a speech in Belarussian (rather than Russian, which most people use), in which he said, “we are not Russian- we are Belarusians,” and later encouraged the use of Belarusian. In fact, from 2014 to 2017, trade and border disputes, coupled with anti-Russian and anti-Belarussian voices on both sides, led to a weakening of the relationship between the two countries.
Lukashenko believed that his experiment with nationalism, instead of pro-Russianism, would pay off. He hoped that it would bolster his own power, rid the country of Putin’s economic interests, and propagate a sense of pride in finally being independent from Belarus’ long-time ally. However, promoting nationalism also encouraged the population to look beyond Russia’s sphere of influence towards rich and democratized nations like the Baltic States, who were capable of having their own national identities along with economic prosperity and freedom inside of Western institutions like NATO and the EU. Because of Lukashenko’s attempt to create a Belarussian identity, a pro-democracy movement slowly began to form in preparation for a challenge in the 2020 presidential election.
Lukashenko’s shift was also unagreeable to Putin. As shown in Figure 2, exports to Belarus sharply declined following the Crimean annexation in 2014, hitting a record low in 2015. This is yet another example of Russia’s ability to punish Belarus when they start to drift from Putin’s orbit.
The pro-democracy movement in Belarus, continued
And now, with Lukashenko and his government in a highly vulnerable state following the 2020 poll, Putin and his allies in the Kremlin wanted to capitalize on the Belarussian leader’s weakened bargaining position. At the Sochi meeting, Putin has conditions for his countries continued support of the Lukashenko regime.
First, the Kremlin prioritized economic integration through the Union State and the EAEU. Although Putin was willing to let the Union State fail in the early 2000s, as previously mentioned, he now seems eager to build a stronger connection between Belarus and Russia. Unlike the early 2000s, Belarus is now displaying outward signs of support for Western institutions, something Putin very much wants to stop. Likewise, integration throughout the 2020s would allow Putin to gain more control of the nation through energy contracts, and would also give him more political pressure to use against the Belarussian government. It is likely that a condition of the aforementioned $1.5 billion loan required Lukashenko’s commitment to the Union State project and the EAEU, through revising or adding to the Belarussian constitution. In fact, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated the Kremlin is prepared to help Belarus by sharing the Kremlin’s “experience” in writing constitutional amendments- a reference to the Kremlin’s changes to the Russian constitution in July 2020.
Second, Putin wants the eventual phasing out and end of Lukahsenko’s 16-year rule, a condition ultimately connected to economic integration and constitutional reform. On November 26th, 2020, Putin sent Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to meet with Lukashenko in Minsk. In a publicized meeting, Lavrov reiterated his country’s commitment to Belarus and assailed Western interference in Belarussian internal affairs. However, Lavrov’s message was not directed towards Western capitals- it was directed to Lukashenko himself.
In a humiliating lecture, Lavrov layed out a political ultimatum to Lukashenko on behalf of an increasingly frustrated Putin. He specifically referred to constitutional reforms beyond economic integration, a move by Russia that many see as the Kremlin attempting to engineer a pro-Russian transition of power in Belarus. Lavrov’s visit indicated that Russia recognizes the fundamental weakness of Lukashenko’s present position, and that the Kremlin does not plan on propping him up indefinitely. Instead, Moscow is attempting to find a solution that will calm the current crisis without threatening Russia’s geopolitical interests in the country. So far, Russian intervention in Belarus has not been intended as a show of support for Lukashenko. Instead, it has been driven by Putin’s ideological proccuption with pro-democracy uprisings in the post-Soviet neighborhood.
Overall, the pro-democracy movement in Belarus represents a slight course correction in Putin’s ideological complex. Unlike the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin is not responding with force (which ultimately pushed Ukraine further from Russia’s orbit). With Russian influence in retreat throughout the region, Moscow no longer appears keen to intervene directly with military force. Instead, we may be witnessing the beginnings of a more nuanced “approach that sees Russia in the role of adjudicator rather than enforcer.” This change in foreign policy also indicates another key variable driving Putin: his quest to remain in power. It is clear that the Kremlin leader is willing to change and abandon strategies that become more risky over time.
Furthermore, what seems to be driving Putin in this conflict is his fear of western institutions, which were discussed in previous sections. It is unlikely that the Kremlin strongman is worried about Belarus joining NATO or the EU anytime soon, but he is worried about the perception of a pro-democracy movement swaying power within the Russian-orbit. His obsession with outcomes of the Color Revolutions in the early 21th century are proof that Putin believes in holding up a flawed perception: that Russia is on a path to greatness, regardless of a faltering economy and standard of political freedom. A central part of Putin’s foreign policy approach towards Belarus has been his obsession with keeping the status quo of Russian domination. And if Lukashenko is unwilling or becomes unable to facilitate the necessity of the situation, Putin has no problem replacing him. For him, appearances are just as important as reality. As long as he is able to stay in power with limited repercussions domestically, Putin is willing to do whatever is necessary to stay in control of the moment.
Conclusion
Putin’s foriegn policy towards Russia is influenced by his fear of Western institutions and his obsession with hanging onto the reigns of powers. Throughout this review, we have discussed important geopolitical tools he uses to subjugate Belarus: pro-Russian institutions like the EAEU, the energy dependence apparatus, and forced concessions from President Lukasehnko.
Putin would like very much for Belarus to continue on its pro-Russian trajectory, regardless of who is leading the country. However, with the recent pro-democracy movement and popular opinion in the country shifting close to NATO and the EU, Putin is most certainly feeling the pressure around him. The near abroad, whether it be Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Belarus, is slowly starting to shake itself loose from Russia’s dominance. For the first time in his two decades as president, Vladimir Putin is worried that his Russian world may come crumbling down– bring himself with it.
